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About CTSC 
The mission of the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC,​ trustedci.org​) is 
to improve the cybersecurity of NSF science and engineering projects, while allowing those 
projects to focus on their science endeavors.  This mission is accomplished through one-on-one 
engagements with projects to solve their specific problems, broad education, outreach and 
training to raise the practice-of-security across the community, and looking for opportunities 
for improvement to bring in research to raise the state-of-practice. 
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1 Introduction 
This technical report collects a series of CTSC blog posts on identity management (IdM) 
best practices published in 2014 for archival purposes. 
 
2 Outsourcing Identity Management 
Identity Management (IdM) in scientific cyberinfrastructure is a means to an end: provide 
convenient and secure access to applications, data, instruments, and services so scientists 
can focus on the science. Implementing a custom IdM solution can be a significant drain on 
resources for science projects. Outsourcing IdM can help with managing user identities, 
credentials, groups, and profiles. Three IdM outsourcing options that we see used in US 
scientific cyberinfrastructure are Globus Nexus, Agave, and Google Apps for Education. 
 
Globus Nexus provides identity, profile, and group management as part of the ​Globus 
Platform​, which is designed to support data-intensive collaborative research. Multiple 
research projects have adopted Globus Nexus for identity management, including ​US 
ATLAS​, ​OSG​, and ​KBase​. Globus Nexus supports federated identities via 
InCommon​/​CILogon​ and Google OpenID, as well as ​user-managed groups​. US ATLAS and 
OSG use ​CI Connect​ to integrate with Globus Nexus. The ​KBase Authentication​ developer 
tutorial demonstrates KBase’s integration with Globus Nexus via an OAuth/REST API. 
 
Agave​ is a science-as-a-service platform, designed to support science gateways, that was 
developed by the ​iPlant Collaborative​. Agave provides hosted identity, profile, and group 
management via an OAuth/REST API. Science gateways can integrate with iPlant identities 
(hosted in the Agave platform), use Agave as a hosted OpenID Connect interface to their 
existing identity solutions, or leverage Agave’s identity-as-a-service offering. For example, 
the ​Bioextract Server​ and ​CIPRES​ science gateways now accept iPlant identities for login 
via Agave, the ​Arabidopsis Informatics Portal​ and ​VDJServer​ leverage Agave’s hosted 
identity service, and the ​Texas Advanced Computing Center​ uses Agave with their Active 
Directory to provide OAuth protection to their internal and external APIs. 
 
The ​Google Apps for Education​ collaboration platform is widely used for smaller scientific 
collaborations, due to ease of setup and powerful collaboration tools (Docs, Forms, Groups, 
Chat, Hangouts, etc.) provided out-of-the-box. External applications can integrate with 
Google identities and Google+ profiles via ​OpenID Connect​. Google Apps also supports 
SAML SSO​ for integration with campus identities. Google’s ​Directory API​ provides an 
OAuth/REST interface to ​Google Groups​. 
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3 HTTPS Best Practices 
Using HTTP Over TLS (​HTTPS​ or Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) helps users ensure 
that they are connecting to the correct web site and that their communications are 
protected from eavesdropping and tampering in transit. Using HTTPS for banking and 
e-commerce web sites is an obvious requirement, but HTTPS is also valuable for scientific 
cyberinfrastructure (CI), where users log in to access valuable scientific resources and rely 
on the integrity of their research data. ​Always-On-SSL​ describes the recommended best 
practice of enabling HTTPS across an entire website, rather than only specific areas of the 
site, to protect the user’s entire web session. 
 
The first step to enable HTTPS on a web site is to obtain a certificate for the site. CI 
providers should use HTTPS certificates issued by certificate authorities that are well 
known to standard web browsers so users do not learn to click through security warnings 
for so-called self-signed certificates. In many cases, CI providers can obtain HTTPS 
certificates from their home campus’ IT department, which may be participating in the 
InCommon Certificate Service​ program or have an established contract with another 
certificate provider. 
 
Tools and guides are available to assist with maintaining a secure HTTPS configuration. 
The ​Qualys SSL Server Test​ tool analyzes a site’s HTTPS configuration to identify problems 
and areas for improvement. Qualys updates their test tool to check for the latest HTTPS 
security issues (such as the recent ​Heartbleed​ bug), so using the tool periodically can help 
verify that a site’s HTTPS configuration remains up-to-date. ​Comodo​ and ​DigiCert​ also 
provide HTTPS test tools. For up-to-date HTTPS server configuration recommendations 
and examples, see the guides provided and maintained by ​Mozilla​ and ​Qualys​.  
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4 Self Service Password Reset 
Self service password reset is an important capability for any scientific cyberinfrastructure (CI) 
providers that manage passwords for a large user community. Without it, providers risk being 
overwhelmed by support requests from users who forgot their password and risk being the 
victim of social engineering attacks against support staff following ad-hoc, manual password 
reset procedures. 
 
We differentiate between ​password change​ and ​password reset​. Password ​change​ is when the 
user enters both current and new passwords to update the password for an account. Password 
reset​ is when the user has forgotten the current password for the account and needs to establish 
a new password. 
 
CI providers should avoid re-implementing the password reset workflow if possible. Using 
external identity providers (e.g., ​InCommon​ and/or ​Google​) can avoid the risks of managing 
passwords directly, enables users to log in via an account that they use regularly (so users are 
less likely to forget the password), benefits from security features such as two factor 
authentication, and leverages the password recovery support of the external identity provider(s). 
Alternatively, CI providers could use an existing password reset workflow built-in to their web 
application framework (e.g., ​Joomla​ or ​Laravel​) or identity management (IDM) platform. 
 
However, in our experience CI providers still sometimes find the need to implement password 
reset in their unique environment. In this article, we provide an example email-based password 
reset workflow and discuss design choices and risks that CI providers should consider when 
implementing password reset. The workflow assumes that users have previously registered a 
contact email address that can be used for password resets. 
4.1 Password Reset Workflow 
The goal of the following workflow is to allow a registered user to reset their password without 
requiring assistance from support staff. 
 
1. On the “Sign In” page, the user clicks the “Forgot Password?” link. 
2. The user is prompted to enter their username or registered email address. 
3. The user is prompted to “check your email for a password reset code to enter below”. 
4. The user enters the password reset code on the web form. 
5. The user enters their newly chosen password. 
6. The user can now sign in with the newly chosen password. 
4.1.1 Behind the Scenes 
To implement this workflow, the web application performs the following actions behind the 
scenes: 
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When the user enters a username or email address (step #2), the web application checks for a 
match with a valid user account. As with any input provided by the user, the web application 
sanitizes the username and email address values before querying back-end databases, to protect 
against injection attacks. In response to the user’s submission, the web application does not 
indicate whether a match was found, to avoid disclosing the existence of registered accounts to 
unauthenticated users. Instead, whether a match was found or not, the web application displays, 
“Please check your email for a password reset code to enter below. If you do not receive an email 
message, please contact the help desk” (step #3). If the username or email address provided by 
the user does not match a valid account, no further action is taken. 
 
If the web application finds a valid account matching the user’s input, the next step is to generate 
the password reset code (for example, an 8 digit random number), store a salted hash of the reset 
code (for example, using ​bcrypt​) with a timestamp and the user’s account ID, and send the email 
message to the user’s registered email address. The password reset code is a time-limited, 
one-time-use random “​nonce​” value to confirm that the user received the message at the 
registered email address. The web application removes stored reset code entries immediately 
after use or after the time limit (for example, 15 minutes) has elapsed. 
 
Next, the user enters the password reset code from the email message on the web form (step #4). 
The web application hashes the entered reset code and searches for a match among the current 
stored values. If no match is found, the application displays an error and prompts the user to try 
again (for example, allowing up to 3 tries before aborting the process). If a match is found, the 
application prompts the user to enter a new password (twice for confirmation) (step #5) and 
checks that the new password is sufficiently strong. If it is, the application changes the user’s 
password to the new value, removes the stored reset code entry, and sends a confirmation email 
to the user’s registered email address. The user can now return to the standard “Sign In” page 
and proceed to log in with the new password (step #6). 
4.1.2 Password Reset Email Messages 
The above workflow sends two email messages to the user’s registered email address: 1) the 
message containing the password reset code and 2) the message notifying the user that the 
password reset completed successfully. These messages should follow ​recommended practices 
for email communications​, including a trustworthy From address (in the correct DNS domain) 
and no HTML content. The messages should also include instructions for contacting the help desk 
if the user did not initiate the password reset. The user’s password should never be sent in email 
messages. 
4.1.3 Logging and Monitoring 
The password reset capability can be a target for attacks and a source of user support issues, so it 
is especially important to log all system activities related to password resets and monitor for 
unexpected behavior. Log messages should have accurate timestamps and should include the 
originating IP address for password reset requests. 
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4.1.4 Risks 
The primary risk for the password reset process is the possibility that an attacker could reset a 
valid user’s password and thereby obtain unauthorized access. Potential attack vectors include: 
❏ Disclosure of reset code via email​: Since the password reset code is sent over unsecured email, 
it could potentially be disclosed via email account compromise or network eavesdropping, 
allowing an attacker to use the code to change the user’s password. Enforcing a short lifetime 
on the reset code limits the window of vulnerability against this attack. 
❏ Network disclosure of passwords​: The web application should follow ​HTTPS best practices​ to 
protect passwords against active and passive man-in-the-middle and phishing attacks. 
❏ Exposure of reset code database​: Storing reset codes in hashed (salted) form in the web 
application protects against disclosure of valid reset codes due to inadvertent disclosure of the 
reset code database. 
❏ Brute force attacks on reset codes​: Generating long, random reset codes, valid for only a short 
time, makes it infeasible for an attacker to successfully guess a reset code through brute force. 
Aborting the reset process after 3 failed reset code entries also protects against guessing 
attacks. However, beware making reset codes so long that they are inconvenient for users to 
input. (8 random digits is a reasonable length.) 
❏ Compromise of the password reset front-end web application​: In a system architecture with a 
back-end authentication system (LDAP, Kerberos, etc.) that may be shared across multiple 
front-end systems, enabling a front-end web application to reset passwords introduces the 
risk that an attacker who compromises the web application could reset many user passwords 
and gain further unauthorized access. Unlike password ​change​ (which requires knowledge of a 
current valid password prior to making password updates), password ​reset​ trusts the web 
application to update passwords without further validation by the back-end authentication 
system. Isolating the password reset functionality to a dedicated, well-secured front-end 
system can help to mitigate this risk, as well as logging and monitoring on the back-end 
system. 
4.1.5 Examples 
The “Forgot Password?” links on the ​XSEDE User Portal​ and on ​HUBzero​ provide illustrative 
examples of self service password reset functionality similar to what is described above. 
4.2 Self Service and Exceptional Cases 
If all goes well with the above workflow, the user is able to reset their password without 
assistance from help desk staff, hence “self service”. However, the user may still need assistance if 
(for example) they lose access to a previously registered email address and therefore can not 
complete the self service workflow. It is important to have documented processes for handling 
these exceptional cases at the help desk without introducing new risks for social engineering 
attacks. A phone call from the help desk to a previously registered phone number can help 
re-establish account ownership. However, when in doubt as to the identity of the account holder, 
it may be better to ask the user to create a new account rather than risk improperly resetting the 
password on an existing account. 
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5 Conclusion 
For current best practice recommendations and other information about CTSC activities, 
visit the CTSC blog at ​http://blog.trustedci.org/​.  
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